Andrew H. Wilson 11 WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO 2 235 Montgomery Street Suite 450 3 San Francisco, California 94104 (415) 391-3900 4 RECEIVED Laurie J. Bartilson 5 BOWLES & MOXON 6255 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 2000 JAN 1 9 1994 6 Hollywood, CA 90028 (213) 953-3360 **HUB LAW OFFICES** 7 Attorneys for Plaintiff and 8 Cross-Defendant CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL 9 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 FOR THE COUNTY OF MARIN 12) CASE NO. 157 680 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a California not-13 for-profit religious corporation;) PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO) DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITIONS TO 14 PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO Plaintiffs, COMPEL PRODUCTION OF 15 DOCUMENTS VS. 16 GERALD ARMSTRONG; MICHAEL WALTON; 17 et al., Defendants. 18 19 GERALD ARMSTRONG, Cross-Complainant, 201 DATE: January 21, 1994 TTME: 9:00 a.m. 211 VS. DEPT: 1 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a California DISCOVERY CUT-OFF: None Corporation; DAVID MISCAVIGE; 23. MOTION CUT-OFF: None DOES 1 to 100; 24 Cross-Defendant. TRIAL DATE: None 25 Plaintiff and cross-defendant, Church of Scientology 26 International files this consolidated reply in support of its 27 pending motions to compel. 28

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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Church of Scientology International ("the Church") served requests for documents on defendants Gerald Armstrong, the Gerald Armstrong Corporation, and Michael Walton on August 9, 1993 and September 16, 1993. Defendants' response was to object to all of the requests, and to refuse to produce anything. [Moving Papers, Ex. B.] The Church sought to meet and confer with defendants to resolve their objections short of motion practice. [Moving Papers, Ex. C.] Defendants' response was silence. [Moving Papers, Declaration of Andrew Wilson, ¶ 2.] On November 22, 1993 and November 30, 1993, the Church filed three motions to compel further responses to the requests. [Moving Papers.] The defendants responded by seeking to have the hearing date for the motion extended to January 21, 1994. [Ex. A.] Now, 5 months since the initial request was made, and literally one day before this reply was due to be filed, Defendant Armstrong has finally produced a few documents in response to the request, and has filed amended responses which admit that the bulk of his initial objections were baseless.2

However, Armstrong and his alter ego corporation have still refused to produce documents responsive to 20 requests, claiming that the requests violate Armstrong's "right to privacy." He has

¹ The Church's counsel received handservice of some documents for the first time on Tuesday, January 18, 1994. [Declaration of Laurie Bartilson.]

In his Amended Responses to Plaintiff's Second Request for Production of Documents, for example, Armstrong agrees to produce without objection documents responsive to 7 categories of requests (all of which he objected to in October) and admits that he has no documents responsive to 7 requests (all of which he also objected to in October).

not provided plaintiff with any log designating the identity of the documents for which he is claiming a privilege, as required by the Code of Civil Procedure, so plaintiff is left to guess at the extent and nature of the discovery which Armstrong seeks to conceal. Further, Armstrong has stated that he will only produce documents in response to some of the requests to the extent that he considers the documents to be relevant to the litigation. California law is clear, however, that this is not a determination that a party is permitted to simply make on his own: Armstrong is required, at the very least, to identify each document which is responsive to plaintiff's request, but which he has refused to produce because he doesn't think it is relevant.

Finally, defendant Michael Walton has filed a "joinder" in Armstrong's oppositions to the motions, but has done nothing to either amend his responses or produce any documents. Yet many of Armstrong's amended responses insist that Armstrong has no responsive documents -- because Walton has them. This is simply a failure to respond in good faith to discovery, and a "shell game" being played by defendants, at the expense of the plaintiff.

Defendants' depositions have been set in this matter for February 3 and 4, 1994. Plaintiff requires these documents in order to proceed expeditiously with the depositions.

Accordingly, plaintiff requests that the Court require defendants to produce all responsive documents on or before January 27, 1994; and require defendants to pay to plaintiff the cost of bringing these motions. Further, plaintiff requests that this Court, on its own motion, appoint a referee to hear and determine

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all discovery motions and disputes and to supervise depositions in this action pursuant to C.C.P. § 639.3

II. THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS ARE RELEVANT AND NOT PRIVILEGED

Defendant Armstrong admits that the issues of this case squarely concern his financial dealings (or misdealings) and that plaintiff is entitled to full disclosure of documents which are fundamental to its case. [Oppo. at 6 - 7.] Armstrong asserts, however, that he is entitled to "narrowly circumscribe" plaintiff's discovery, and pick and choose himself which documents are "relevant" and "fundamental," and which he is not required to disclose. [Oppo. at 8.]

This proposed procedure is no doubt attractive to Armstrong; it is not the procedure authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure. C.C.P. § 2031(f) provides in relevant part that a party seeking to prevent discovery of documents which it considers privileged must "identify with particularity any document . . . falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made, and . . . set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection." It is up to the Court, and not Armstrong, to determine whether or not the documents in question are indeed privileged or private in any fashion and, if so, if Armstrong's claimed privacy interest outweighs plaintiff's need for discovery. Valley Bank of Nevada

In the event that the Court finds that some of defendants' claims of privilege may be warranted (a difficult proposition since defendants have refused to even identify the supposedly privileged matter), plaintiff requests that defendants be ordered to produce a log of those documents as to which they are claiming privilege pursuant to C.C.P. §2031(f)(3) to plaintiff and the discovery referee on or before January 27, 1994, so that the questions of privilege may be ruled upon before their scheduled depositions.

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v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 654, 125 Cal.Rptr. 553. Cases cited by Armstrong concerning pretrial discovery of financial information for punitive damage recovery are not relevant; where, as here, defendants' finances are directly related to the substantive claim involved, they are discoverable. Rawnsley v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 86, 227 Cal.Rptr. 806.

Here, Armstrong has made no effort to identify what documents exist which he claims are privileged. He has asserted, as to 2 requests, that he will produce some documents, but will withhold unspecified other documents which he claims are private. As to 20 more requests, he asserts that any responsive documents are irrelevant, private or both.

All of the requests, however, seek documents that are plainly relevant to the issues of this case, or are likely to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. Further, Armstrong's claimed right of "privacy" is non-existent or waived as to many of them.

For example, plaintiff has requested that Armstrong produce a manuscript which he titled, "ONE HELL OF A STORY" and which purports to be a treatment for a screenplay about his alleged experiences in and with Scientology. This "private" document which Armstrong seeks to protect was given by him to Entertainment Television, and both described and shown on their national program, Entertainment Tonight. The document is plainly relevant (or likely to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence) because it purports to discuss Armstrong' activities during, inter alia, 1990 to the present -- the exact time period relevant to this dispute. Plaintiff claims that, beginning in

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August, 1990, Armstrong and the other defendants entered into a fraudulent scheme designed to render Armstrong "judgment proof."

The complaint alleges that Armstrong cached his assets, but kept control of them, and then began breaching his settlement agreement with plaintiff, in an effort to coerce plaintiff into paying him still more money in order to secure once again Armstrong's previously-promised cooperation. Manuscripts written by Armstrong during this period which purport to describe his life and experiences are thus highly relevant to the issue of fraudulent intent.

Moreover, Armstrong has claimed in deposition that his writings, art work and other properties are (1) highly valuable [Ex. B, Deposition of Gerald Armstrong, March 10, 1993, 549:15 - 550:14] and (2) were transferred by him to the Gerald Armstrong Corporation [Ex. C, GA Depo., October 8, 1992 at 466:3-12.] Thus, these claimed assets form some of the res which is directly at issue horoin. Plaintiff is entitled to obtain their discovery, and have them independently appraised. Similarly, plaintiff is entitled to discover into the correspondence which Armstrong has entered into in an effort to sell, produce or transfer these assets.

Similarly, Armstrong proposes to supply plaintiff with some of his financial records, but refuses to provide others. 5 Yet

⁴ The requests for documents relevant to these issues, for which Armstrong has refused to produces any documents, are the First Request for Production, Numbers 3 - 10.

⁵ Specifically, Armstrong has refused to provide any documents at all in response to Plaintiff's Second Request for Production of Documents, Requests No. 13 (asking for documents (continued...)

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Armstrong's financial transactions from 1986 forward are the precise subject of this action. Plaintiff may well discover during the course of the action that Armstrong transferred property to others than Walton, or that some additional transfers were made after his confessed August, 1990 transfers, requiring plaintiff to amend its pleadings in order to effect full recovery. Armstrong may not avoid discovery into his financial dealings on the novel theory that since plaintiff has not yet found out about more of his fraudulent schemes, he has a right to keep the details from being discovered. 6 Plaintiff is entitled to immediate production of all documents from Armstrong and his

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^{5(...}continued) identifying Armstrong's accountants and financial managers); No. 14 (asking for financial statements, including balance sheets); and No. 15 (asking for documents reflecting his bank accounts).

Armstrong's argument that he should be permitted to refrain from providing discovery because of the plaintiff's alleged "bad character" is ludicrous. Armstrong's stale and tired refrain that plaintiff will subject him to what he terms "fair game" is an invention of Armstrong designed to engender sympathy which is undeserving. Armstrong's viewpoint is that the court systems exist for no reason other than to subject him to "fair game;" indeed, he has repeatedly accused plaintiff's counsel of being "front groups" trying to drive him insane by such ordinary actions as filing a complaint [Ex. D, Depo. of Armstrong, June 24, 1992 at 33:6-33:22.] If anyone has been subjected to "fair game," it is plaintiff and its counsel, who have had to endure the near-constant deluge of false accusation from Armstrong for daring to suggest that Armstrong should be held to the contract which he signed. latest suggestion that plaintiff's counsel should not be permitted to view ordered discovery because of Armstrong's claims as to her religious beliefs is simply outrageous. [Oppo. at 11.] Bartilson's religious beliefs are certainly private, and not the legitimate concern of Armstrong or his irresponsible counsel, Mr. Greene. However, the Court may rest assured that they do not include <u>any</u> of the matters falsely and outrageously asserted by Armstrong. [Declaration of Laurie J. Bartilson.] Indeed, Ms. Bartilson has been an officer of the court since 1979, when she was first admitted to practice in Wisconsin, and has been a member in good standing of the California State Bar since December, 1988. [Id.)

alter ego, the Gerald Armstrong Corporation.

Moreover, because of Armstrong's willful delay in complying with discovery, Armstrong should be ordered to pay plaintiff's expenses in bringing this motion. C.C.P. §§ 2023 (a)(4),(5),(6), (8); 2023(b)(1); 2031(1).

III. WALTON'S OBJECTIONS ARE RAISED IN BAD FAITH

Michael Walton has refused to produce any documents at all. He has objected to all of plaintiff's requests, which reasonably seek documents related to the transfers alleged in the complaint. His objections, which parallel the objections made by Armstrong and largely abandoned, have not been explained or amplified by Walton, despite requests by plaintiff's counsel. Walton attempts to rely on Armstrong's opposition, but Armstrong has said nothing to explain Walton's refusal to produce either, instead asserting that 5 of plaintiff's requests made to Armstrong are for documents which Walton possesses.

Under these circumstances, Walton's refusal to reasonably participate in the discovery process is simply bad faith. He should be ordered to produce all of the requested documents, and ordered to pay plaintiff's expenses in bringing this motion.

C.C.P. §§ 2023 (a)(3),(4),(5),(6),(8); 2023 (b)(1); 2031(1):

IV. CONCLUSION

Armstrong and Walton have successfully avoided substantial discovery in this action for more than 5 months. The documents requested are basic to plaintiff's complaint and the defenses raised by Armstrong and Walton. Now, as plaintiff's motions are finally about to be heard, Armstrong has finally provided plaintiffs with a few documents, and refused to even identify

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those for which he is claiming a privilege. Walton has neither produced nor identified any documents, although Armstrong has asserted that Walton possesses 5 categories of relevant documents. With their depositions imminent, plaintiff requests that this Court: (1) order defendants to produce the documents in full on or before January 27, 1994; (2) order that all further discovery matters, including the taking of depositions, take place before a discovery referee; and (3) order defendants to pay plaintiff's costs of bringing these motions. Dated: January 19, 1994 Respectfully submitted, BOWLES & MOXON ву: Zaur/ie Barti 1son Andrew H. Wilson WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO Attorneys for Plaintiff CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY TNYERNATIONAL

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I declare that I am employed in the City and County of San Francisco, California.

I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action. My business address is 235 Montgomery Street, Suite 450, San Francisco, California.

On January 19, 1994, I caused the attached copy of PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; and DECLARATION OF LAURIE J. BARTILSON IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITIONS TO MOTIONS TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANTS to be hand served via Lightening Messenger Service to the following at the addresses listed below:

Ford Greene, Esq. HUB LAW OFFICES 711 Sir Francis Drake Blvd. San Anselmo, California

Michael Walton 707 Fawn Dr. San Anselmo, CA 94960

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at San Francisco, California on January 19,_

Falmer